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Contracting Trademark Fame?
Leah Chan Grinvald*
Contractsabound in today's highly digitized society. Did you snap a
pic and upload it to Instagram? You entered into a contract. Didyou
check yourfriends'statuses on Facebook? Yep, you also entered into a
contract. Didyou know you entered into a contract or even ifyou were
aware of this fact, did you know the terms to which you agreed?
Probably not. But despite this, we are all obligatedby these contracts,
so long as we aresomehow made aware that we could readthe terms at
some point if we had the inclination to do so. Online companies are
rationally taking advantage of this, and are inserting clauses into the
online agreements we enter into with them that place them in better
legal positions. These clauses rangefrom waiver of legal rights, choice
of law andforum selectionfor disputes, and restrictions on intellectual
property rights. Even though we are likely not aware of these clauses
until well after we have agreed to them, courts typically uphold their
binding nature based on an objective theory of contract law. Although
scholars and commentators have raised numerous concerns related to
the applicationof this theory to online contracting, I am concernedwith
an avenue that has not yet been explored: the possible extension of this
theory to trademark law.
The reason this concern exists lies in the doctrine of trademarkfame
and developments in the use of online agreements to have all of the
website's claimed trademarks recognized by its website users. Fame is
the gold standardin trademark law, which enables a trademark holder
to control almost anything that anyone else does with the famous mark.
Yet, fame is extremely hard to prove and requires strong evidence of
consumer recognition and commercial strength. Due to this, some
* © 2015 Leah Chan Grinvald. Associate Professor of Law (with tenure), Suffolk University
Law School. B.A., The George Washington University; J.D., NYU School of Law. For their
helpful comments and conversations regarding this Article, I would like to thank Barton Beebe,
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trademark holders may be turning to newer forms of evidence, such as
website agreements to potentially bolster claims of fame. Given the
large number of users of some of these websites (for example, Facebook
has over one billion worldwide users), if the objective theory of contract
law were imported (even subconsciously) into the trademark realm, it
would seem to be an easy argument that "Face" and "Book" are
separatelyfamous trademarks. As such, some trademarkholders would
be given virtually limitless control over all terms incorporating these
generic or merely descriptive words.
I question whether the
importation of this contract law theory into trademark law would be a
normatively positive development and conclude that it should not be.
Yet, because the utilization of online agreements are a tempting shortcut
for difficult decisions regarding trademarkfame, I offer some ideas to
resolve the problems of using such contracts in trademark litigation,
includingadopting an interactive theory of trademarkfame.
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INTRODUCTION

In today's society, we are clicking, tapping, swiping, and browsing
on the Internet almost every minute of the day.' We chuckle at a
stranger's funny cat video upload, buy or rent the books we need to
study with for the semester, virtually check in with our friends, and
browse reviews on where we should spend our next spring break.
Throughout all of this activity, we are entering into contracts with the
online company providing us with the chuckle or sending us our books. 2
But a meager 0.65% of us are actually reading the terms of these
agreements we have entered into. 3 Despite this fact, courts routinely
uphold these contracts as enforceable, 4 even though we have agreed to
waive legal rights, 5 taken on onerous obligations, 6 or agreed to
acknowledge questionable intellectual property rights. 7 The theory on
which courts base their decisions is a staple of every first-year law
1. See Average Daily Media Use in the U.S. 2014, STATISTA, http://www.statista.com/
statistics/270781/average-daily-media-use-in-the-us/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2016) (finding that the
average American spends 163 minutes per day on a tablet, 159 minutes per day online on a
desktop computer, and 134 minutes per day on a smartphone (nonvoice)).
2. See Terms of Service, Community Guidelines, YOUTUBE (June 9, 2010), https://www.you
tube.com/t/terms ("By using or visiting the YouTube website or any YouTube products, software,
data feeds, and services provided to you on, from, or through the YouTube website (collectively
the 'Service') you signify your agreement to (1) these terms and conditions (the 'Terms of
Service') .... ); Conditions of Use, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display
.htmlnodeld=508088 (last updated Feb. 12, 2016) [hereinafter Amazon TOS] ("By using
Amazon Services, you agree to these conditions. Please read them carefully.").
3. Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R. Trossen, Does Anyone Read the
Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 22 (2014)
(tracking online behavior of 48,154 monthly visitors to ninety different online software
companies and finding that approximately six out of every 1000 visitors reads a fraction of the
online agreement for the website).
4. See Nathan J. Davis, Presumed Assent: The Judicial Acceptance of Clickwrap, 22
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 579 (2007) ("[T]he courts have unanimously found that clicking is a
valid way to manifest assent since the first clickwrap agreement was litigated in 1998."); Cheryl
B. Preston & Eli W. McCann, Unwrapping Shrinkwraps, Clickwraps, and Browsewraps: How
the Law Went Wrong from Horse Traders to the Law of the Horse, 26 BYU J. PuB. L. 1, 30
(2011) ("[C]ourts willing to invalidate any clickwrap are rare.").
5. Amazon TOS, supra note 2 (establishing a waiver of dispute resolution through trial by jury
and requiring all disputes to be resolved through binding arbitration).
6. Yahoo Terms of Service, YAHOO!, https://policies.yahoo.com/us/en/yahoo/terms/utos/
index.htm (last updated Mar. 16, 2016) ("You agree to indemnify and hold Yahoo and its
subsidiaries, affiliates, officers, agents, employees, partners and licensors harmless from any
claim or demand, including reasonable attorneys' fees, made by any third party due to or arising
out of Content you submit, post, transmit, modify or otherwise make available through the Yahoo
Services, your use of the Yahoo Services, your connection to the Yahoo Services, your violation
of the TOS, or your violation of any rights of another.").
7. See, e.g., Amazon TOS, supra note 2 (requiring users to agree not to use Amazon's
trademarks or trade dress that disparages or discredits Amazon, even though the use of
trademarks in this manner may be protected under federal law).
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students' contract law curriculum: the objective theory of contract law,
or the "duty to read." 8
Although numerous scholars and commentators have criticized the
extension of the objective theory of contracts to online contracting, 9 I
am concerned with a further extension of this theory to intellectual
property law. In particular, some recent developments in online
contracting and in trademark litigation lead to the potential of extending
the objective theory of contract law to trademark law. For example,
some online companies are inserting trademark acknowledgment
clauses in their online agreements potentially in order to prove the
strength or fame of their trademarks. 10 "Strong" or "famous" trademark
status enhances the ability of the trademark holder to broadly control all
third-party uses of its trademark, including in reviews, criticism, parody,
and even in online searching. 11 In short, fame has become the gold
8. NANCY S. KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS 7 (2014) ("The courts apply an objective standard to the
contract dealings, meaning that they will assume that the parties were reasonable people and
believed and acted the way reasonable people believe and act."). See generally Charles L. Knapp,
Is there a Duty to Read?, in REVISITING THE CONTRACTS SCHOLARSHIP OF STEWART
MACAULAY: ON THE EMPIRICAL AND THE LYRICAL 315 (Jean Braucher et al. eds., 2013).
9. See MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE 14 (2013) ("One task of this book is to think
again about whether boilerplate should be considered contractual. I want to urge that it should
not, at least not in all of its manifestations."). See generally James Gibson, Vertical Boilerplate,
70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 161 (2013) (attacking the use of boilerplate agreements and the
objective theory of contracts based on market failure); Nancy S. Kim, Situational Duress and the
Aberrance of Electronic Contracts, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 265, 275 (2014) ("The development of
an aberrant doctrine contributed to further aberrance in both the form and the content of electronic
agreements."); Knapp, supra note 8, at 330 ("To speak of [online agreements that contain
unilateral modification clauses] in terms of traditional [duty to read] principles strains that
principle to the breaking point."); Preston & McCann, supra note 4, at 30 ("[U]nknowing
'consent' should not be acceptance of a TOS either.").
10. See, e.g., User Agreement, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/legal/user-agreement
(last updated Oct. 23, 2014) [hereinafter LinkedIn TOS] ("Linkedln reserves all of its intellectual
property rights in the Services. For example, LinkedIn, SlideShare, LinkedIn (stylized), the
SlideShare and "in" logos and other LinkedIn trademarks, service marks, graphics, and logos
used in connection with Linkedin are trademarks or registered trademarks of Linkedln.");
Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK (Nov. 15, 2013) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Facebook 2013 TOS] ("You will not use our copyrights or trademarks (including
Facebook, the Facebook and F Logos, FB, Face, Poke, Book . .. marks), except as expressly
permitted by our Brand Usage Guidelines or with our prior written permission."). In this Article,
I use the term "fame" to encompass the entire spectrum of strength that a trademark may have
over the course of its lifetime, ranging from acquisition of secondary meaning, to becoming a
strong mark, and then to potentially a famous mark. Professor McCarthy provides a "strength
thermometer" to show this spectrum. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 11:75 (4th ed. 1996).
11. See James Burrough, Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 276 (7th Cir. 1976)
("What is intended by references to 'strong' and 'weak' marks is the effect of such marks upon
the mind of the consuming public. A mark that is strong because of its fame or uniqueness, is
more likely to be remembered and more likely to be associated in the public mind with a greater
breadth of products and services than is a mark that is weak because relatively unknown or very
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standard in trademark law to which many large multinational brands
aspirel 2 and the temptation to extend the objective theory of contracting
to this area is very real. If courts applied this theory to these online
agreements as evidence for fame, proving such becomes a slam dunk
for some large companies.13
While there might be an efficiency argument to be made about this
type of evidence, the potential importation of the objective theory of
contracting into trademark law deserves more attention for at least two
reasons. The first reason is a theoretical disconnect between contract
law and trademark law. The objective theory of online contracting is
premised on an efficiency and notice rationale: online contracts are an
efficient mechanism with which to conduct business. 14 If reasonable
notice is given, users have a duty to read under traditional contract law
doctrine, and will be presumed to have assented to the contract if they
continue with use of the website (even if they have never laid eyes on
the online agreement).1 5 On the other hand, the goal of trademark law
like similar marks or very like the name of the product."); see also Timothy Denny Greene & Jeff
Wilkerson, Understanding Trademark Strength, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REv. 535, 544 (2013) ("[T]he
stronger a mark, the wider its scope of protection and thus the more third-party uses it can block
from the stream of commerce."); Leah Chan Grinvald, A Tale of Two Theories of Well-Known
Marks, 13 VAND. J. ENT. TECH. L. 1, 16 (2010) ("[I]f a trademark has acquired an increased level
of consumer recognition, the breadth of the owner's rights expands.").
12. See, e.g., Benny Evangelista, Monster Fiercely Protects Its Name: Cable Products
Company Sues Those Who Use M- Word, S.F. CHRON. (Nov. 8, 2004, 4:00 AM), http://www.sf
(describing
gate.com/bayarea/article/Monster-fiercely-protects-its-name-Cable-2675907.php
Monster Cable's attempts at policing its trademark in order to strengthen its legal rights).
13. To be clear, I am not arguing against the use by these entities of monthly active users to
prove fame. In fact, the number of monthly active users is a good proxy for consumer
recognition-but only for those trademarks that are actually used on the website. See infra Part
IV. For example, Facebook has included in prior online agreements a number of different
trademarks that it does not use on its website, such as "Face" and "Book." See Facebook 2013
TOS, supra note 10. It has also argued in opposition proceedings at the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office that it has famous trademarks not only for those marks it uses on the website,
such as Facebook, but also for other marks it does not individually use on the website, such as
"Face" or "Fbook." See Notice of Opposition, Facebook, Inc. v. facewerk, No. 91208601 -OPP
(T.T.A.B. Dec. 21, 2012), http://ttabvue.uspto.gov/ttabvue/v?pno=91208601&pty-OPP&eno=l
(claiming fame for "Face"); Notice of Opposition, Facebook, Inc. v. Teachbook.com LLC, No.
91194136-OPP (T.T.A.B. Mar. 15, 2010), http://ttabvue.uspto.gov/ttabvue/v?pno=91194136&
pty-OPP&eno=l (claiming fame for "Fbook"). The "Facewerk" opposition was merited, but not
because "Face" was a famous trademark. The applicant for "facewerk" was attempting to register
a stylized version of "facewerk" using the same font and colors as "facebook." Compare U.S.
Trademark Application Serial No. 85/588,351 (filed Apr. 3, 2012) ("FACEWRK"), with
FACEBOOK, Registration No. 4,396,483.
14. KiM, supra note 8, at 26.
15. See Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 402 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that
Verio's continued use of Register's website put Verio on notice of Register's online agreement
and therefore it entered into an enforceable contract, even though Verio argued it had never read
the terms).
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(either for trademark infringement or dilution cases) is to recreate the
reality of consumer perception.1 6 Courts purport to assess the actual
reality of strength or fame, albeit through various proxies such as
evidence of marketing and sales efforts. 17 Presuming consumer
recognition of trademarks through an implied assent to online
agreements would substitute consumer reality with a completely
fictitious one. This disconnect between the two theories cautions
against importing the objective theory of contract law into trademark
law.
The second reason that importing contract's objective theory into
trademark law would be detrimental is that it would significantly lower
the burden of proof some trademark holders would have in proving the
fame of their trademarks. While this would not be problematic for truly
famous marks, some entities, such as Amazon, Facebook, and Linkedln
are including (or have included) in their online agreements the
requirement to recognize descriptive or generic terms, such as "A to Z,"
"Book," or "in." 18 However, if these descriptive (or potentially generic)
terms were given "strong" or "famous" trademark status, the ability of
some large multinational corporations to monopolize the English
language would be limitless. For example, if "Book" was given a
famous trademark status, Facebook would be able to monopolize the
online use of the term "Book" (and indeed they are attempting to do so),
even if the use is in a descriptive or generic fashion. 19
Both of these concerns have implications that reach far beyond
trademark law. My concern with importing theories from one field to
another is a broad-based one, as it is often tempting to import legal
theories from one legal field into another. What appears to work in one
field may seem like a panacea in another field. I argue that we should
strive to prevent this from happening at an unconscious level, and
instead, more fully examine and debate whether importation is fully
16.

See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark

Infringement, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1581, 1645 (2006) ("The [multifactor likelihood of confusion]
test itself is essentially a substitute for empirical work. Ideally, a court would determine the
likelihood of consumer confusion by taking testimony from every consumer who has been or will
be exposed to the plaintiffs and defendant's marks.").
17. MCCARTHY, supra note 10, §§ 11:83, 15:30 (citing factors); see also Graeme W. Austin,
Trademarks and the Unburdened Imagination, 69 BROOK. L. REv. 827, 831-32 (2004) ("One of

the unusual things about trademark infringement cases is that liability most often depends on the
state of mind of none of the parties to the litigation. As a result, trademark law must always
apprehend the consumer worldview at a distance.").
18. Amazon TOS, supra note 2 (follow link under "Trademarks"); Facebook 2013 TOS, supra
note 10; LinkedIn TOS, supra note 10.
19. See Facebook, Inc. v. Teachbook.com LLC, 819 F. Supp. 2d 764, 776-77 (N.D. Ill. 2011)
(reciting Teachbook's argument).
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justified. This discussion should focus on a number of factors,
including the theoretical "connect" between fields. Further, my concern
of monopolizing regular words has broad consequences for not just
freedom of speech, but also international business competition. If large
entities are able to "propertize" generic and descriptive words, other
businesses, including competitors of those large entities, will be less
competitive. 20 In fact, the anticompetitive nature of granting trademark
protection to generic and descriptive marks has been the traditional
justification for not granting protection at all to generic marks, and
requiring proof of secondary meaning for descriptive ones. 2 1 Lowering
the hefty burden for proof of fame would eviscerate this foundational
principle of trademark and unfair competition law. 2 2
The remainder of this Article will proceed in four Parts. In the first
Part, I will provide a brief background of the objective theory of
contract law and its application to online agreements. In addition, I will
discuss how online agreements and trademarks intersect through the use
of trademark clauses by a number of large multinational entities in their
online agreements with their users. Then, in Part II, I turn to trademark
law and chart out the various benefits to having a famous trademark, as
well as the evidentiary problems in proving such. After laying this
foundation, in Part III, I will examine the normative question of whether
we should allow the importation of the objective theory of contract law
into trademark law. As outlined above, I will make a case against such
importation, based on two normative grounds. The first is that a
disconnect between the two theories would dislodge the current
approach in attempting to find consumer recognition in trademark law.
Applying the objective theory to consumer recognition of trademarks
would divorce such recognition from reality, as the objective theory
20. Ralph H. Folsom & Larry L. Teply, Trademarked Generic Words, 89 YALE L.J. 1323,
1323 (1980); see also MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 24:104 ("If every trademark could invoke the
antidilution remedy and stop uses of all similar marks in every market and every line of trade, this
would upset the traditional balance of fair versus free competition that is inherent in trademark
law."); Lisa Ramsey, Descriptive Trademarksand the FirstAmendment, 70 TENN. L. REv. 1095,
1098-99 (2003) ("A single business should not have a monopoly on the use of common words
that consumers use to refer generally to a product. A business with an exclusive right to use a
generic term as a mark has an unfair advantage if competitors cannot use the same term to
communicate regarding their own products.").
21. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 10 (2d Cir. 1976)
("[A]ny claim to an exclusive right [to a generic mark] must be denied since this in effect would
confer a monopoly not only of the mark but of the product by rendering a competitor unable
effectively to name what it was endeavoring to sell."); see also Ramsey, supra note 20, at 109899.
22. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 904-05 (9th Cir. 2002) ("A dilution
injunction, by contrast to a trademark injunction, will generally sweep across broad vistas of the
economy.").
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presumes recognition of contract terms, and is not based in actual
reality. The second is that this importation would undermine the
traditional anticompetitive goals of requiring a heavy burden of proof
on those trademark holders seeking famous trademark status. By
lowering the standards for proving fame, large entities would be able to
monopolize large swathes of the English language, to the detriment of
businesses, large and small, and the average consumer. Finally, I
propose some solutions to this issue in Part IV, including making an
argument for an adoption of an "interactive" theory of trademarks to
prove strength or fame of a trademark.
I. THE OBJECTIVE THEORY OF CONTRACTING
All first-year law students in the United States learn the foundational
principles of contract formation: offer, acceptance, consideration, and
mutual assent. 23 The last requirement, mutual assent, means that the
"parties must-at least in the abstract-share the same understanding of
what is being offered and accepted." 2 4 Under classical contract law,
courts applied a "subjective" test of mutual assent, meaning that judges
attempted to figure out whether the contracting parties in reality shared
the same understanding of the contract terms. 2 5 If one of the parties
could prove that he or she did not share the same understanding, courts
would invalidate the contract, as seen in the famous "Peerless" case. 26
As one can imagine, this subjective approach proved unworkable and
had the potential to wreak havoc on the reliability of contracts. After
all, hindsight is twenty-twenty, and if one side of the contract were able
to argue that it truly did not share in the understanding of the other
party, bad business decisions could be undone. For example, in the
Peerless case, the judge allowed the buyer of the cotton to escape
23.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§

17 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) ("[Tlhe formation

of a contract requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of mutual assent to the exchange
and a consideration.").
24. KIM, supra note 8, at 7.
25. CHARLES L. KNAPP, NATHAN M. CRYSTAL & HARRY G. PRINCE, PROBLEMS IN

CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 374 (7th ed. 2012) ("Over the first three-quarters of
the nineteenth century, English and American courts adopted a "subjective" approach to problems
of interpretation. Under the subjectivist view, if the parties attributed materially different
meanings to contractual language, no contract was formed.").
26. Raffles v. Wichelhaus (1864) 159 Eng. Rep. 375, 2 Hurl. & C. 906. In this case, there was
a contract for the sale of cotton, which was to arrive on the Peerless ship from Bombay. It turned
out that there were two Peerless ships sailing from Bombay and the seller meant to deliver the
cotton from the second of the Peerless ships, while the buyer meant to take delivery from the first
of the Peerless ships. In the lawsuit brought by the seller against the buyer, the Court of
Exchequer found in favor of the buyer, holding that "the defendant meant one 'Peerless' and the
plaintiff another. . . . [T]here was no consensus ad idem, and therefore no binding contract." Id
at 376, 2 Hurl. & C. at 907.
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liability for rejecting the shipment he had contracted to purchase
because of the lack of his subjective mutual assent. 2 7
The desire to stabilize the reliability of contracting led to the adoption
of an "objective" test of mutual assent, whereby judges assume that all
parties are reasonable actors. 28 In so doing, judges test for mutual
assent through words or actions taken by reasonable parties in similar
situations. 29 For instance, a reasonable contracting party reads and then
signs a contract when he or she intends to be bound by a contract. 3 0 If a
party later argues that she did not in fact read the contract terms,
although she did sign the contract, a judge will have no sympathy. The
reason being that through an objective lens, the objecting party acted as
if she manifested mutual assent to the contract through signing the
contract. 3 1 A judge would not require that contracting parties be their
brother's keeper by ensuring that the other side actually read and
understood the terms to the contract. 32 All parties have a "duty to read"
before manifesting their assent to a contract. 33
This objective theory of contracting developed during a time when
contracts were typically negotiated in person, between two parties. 34
However, this theory has been extended to apply to all modem-day
2 7. Id.
28. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 201
(1977) (arguing that the objective theory aided business and economic development, as it was
"another measure of the influence of commercial interests in the shaping of American law"). But
see Joseph M. Perillo, The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract Formation and
Interpretation, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 427 (2000) (arguing that in fact the objective theory was
used from the earliest times).
29. ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 9, at 14 (1952) ("It is by the conduct of
two parties, by their bodily manifestations, that we must determine the existence of what is called
agreement.... This is what is meant by mutual assent.").
30. Id. § 31, at 51 ("One who signs his name to a writing that purports to be a contract does an
act that is strong evidence that he intends to make himself a party thereto, bound as a promisor
and entitled as a promisee.").
31. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.26, at 287 (2004) ("A party that signs an
agreement is regarded as manifesting assent to it and may not later complain about not having
read or understood it, even if the agreement is on the other party's standard form."); see Lucy v.
Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516, 517 (Va. 1954) (holding that the defendant's agreement to sell land was
enforceable because he signed an agreement, even though the defendant claimed to have been
joking).
32. Cf Ray v. William G. Eurice & Bros., Inc., 93 A.2d 272, 275, 278 (Md. 1952) (holding
that even though the plaintiffs allegedly read the contract with one of the defendants, the
defendants had a duty to read the contract themselves).
33. FARNSWORTH, supra note 31 ("And since the objective theory of contracts imposes no
requirement that one intend or even understand the legal consequences of one's actions, one is not
entitled to relief merely because one neither read the standard form nor considered the legal
consequence of adhering to it.").
34. See, e.g., CORBIN, supra note 29 (discussing mutual assent, particularly the utilization of
the language of "two parties").
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contracting, even though most contracts are no longer negotiated
instruments, 35 and with the rise of technology, typically not executed in
person. 36 This Part will explore the extension of the objective theory of
contracting to modem contracts, as well as explain how this contract
theory and trademarks overlap.
A. Extending the Objective Theory to Online Agreements
The objective theory of contracting developed at a time when
contracts were negotiated instruments, and typically only between two
parties, with the negotiation done in person. 37 It made sense that if one
party acted in such a way that caused the other party to reasonably
believe that a contract had been entered into, a court should so find.
After all, in this traditional contracting model, if one party had questions
or doubts about specific terms in the contract, they should raise those
concerns at the time of negotiation, not afterwards. A popularly cited
treatise recaps the law as follows:
But if a man acts negligently, and in such a way as to justify others in
supposing that the terms of the writing are assented to by him and the
writing is accepted on that supposition, he will be bound both at law
and in equity. Accordingly, even if an illiterate executes a deed under
a mistake as to its contents, he is bound if he did not require it to be
read to him or its object explained. 38
However, everyday contracting no longer takes the form as it once
did. Legal historians trace the ubiquitous "contract of adhesion" to the
rise of mass production of consumer goods. 39 In the 1920s, expensive
consumer goods, like the Singer sewing machine, became available to
middle-class consumers who could purchase these goods on installment

&

35. See W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking
Power, 84 HARv. L. REV. 529, 529 (1971) ("The contracting still imagined by courts and law
teachers as typical, in which both parties participate in choosing the language of their entire
agreement, is no longer of much more than historical importance.").
36. See, e.g., How it Works, DOCUSIGN, https://www.docusign.com/how-it-works/electronicsignature (last visited Mar. 29, 2016).
37. See supra note 35; see also Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts
About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 629, 630 (1943) ("Since a contract is the result
of the free bargaining of parties who are brought together by the play of the market and who meet
each other on a footing of social and approximate economic equality, there is no danger that
freedom of contract will be a threat to the social order as a whole."); Juliet M. Moringiello
William L. Reynolds, From Lord Coke to Internet Privacy: The Past, Present, and Future of the
Law ofElectronic Contracting, 72 MD. L. REv. 452 (2013).
38. Ray v. William G. Eurice & Bros., Inc., 93 A.2d 272, 278 (Md. 1952) (citing to SAMUEL
WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1577 (rev. ed. 1937)).
39. See Slawson, supra note 35, at 530 ("The predominance of standard forms is the best
evidence of their necessity. They are characteristic of a mass production society and an integral
part of it.").
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plans. 40 With the installment plan came a standard-form contract,
drafted by the manufacturer, and offered to the consumer without any
chance of negotiation (often dubbed "take-it-or-leave-it"

terms). 4 1

Notwithstanding that these contracts no longer had the same indicia as
traditional contracts, these agreements were held enforceable under the
same objective theory of contracting. 4 2 The reasoning for the extension
of the objective theory into newer forms of contracts has been one of
efficiency and business efficacy: the ability by one party to utilize the
same contract terms without variation has arguably spurred on whole
swathes of business industries. 4 3
One of the newest forms of contracts has been the online agreement.
Often containing the suffix "-wrap," these online contracts, such as
"clickwraps" or "browsewraps," are presented to a party in an electronic
format, either on a computer, smartphone, or tablet.44 Not only are
these online agreements adhesive, but the agreeing party does not
always need to manifest assent before she is bound to the agreement.
For clickwrap agreements, courts have held that the action of clicking
the "I agree" button in order to continue with the website service or with
an online purchase is sufficient to manifest assent. 45 This is the case
even where the terms are made available only through a link (as
opposed to a scrollable window) or where the user never reads the
terms. 46 Additionally, these clickwraps may continue to be enforceable

40.

See LENDOL CALDER, FINANCING THE AMERICAN DREAM: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF

CONSUMER CREDIT 162 (1999).
41. Kessler, supra note 37, at 632 ("[S]tandardized contracts are frequently contracts of
adhesion; they are 6 prendre ou a laisser."). Professor Kessler traces the term "contract of
adhesion" to Edwin W. Patterson, The Delivery of a Life-Insurance Policy, 33 HARV. L. REV.
198, 222 (1919) ("Life insurance contracts are contracts of 'adhesion.' The contract is drawn up
by the insurer and the insured, who merely 'adheres' to it, has little choice as to its terms.").
42. See Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L.
REv. 1173, 1185 (1983).
43. KIM, supra note 8, at 27 (noting that the enforcement of contracts of adhesion "reflects
another of contract law's goals, which is to encourage and facilitate economic transactions....
[C]ontracts play an essential role in facilitating transactions because they increase trust, enhance
reliability, and facilitate planning."); Slawson, supra note 35, at 530 ("The predominance of
standard forms is the best evidence of their necessity. They are characteristic of a mass
production society and an integral part of it.").
44. KIM, supra note 8, at 2-3 (explaining "wrap contracts").
45. Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 229, 237-39 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (holding that
plaintiff attorney had consented to the pricing terms of Google's Adwords service even though
the pricing model was not explicitly laid out in the clickwrap, but incorporated another Google
document); Caspi v. Microsoft Network, LLC, 732 A.2d 528 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999)
(holding a forum selection clause enforceable because each of the plaintiffs had clicked their
consent to the Microsoft member agreement containing the forum clause).
46. Kim, supra note 8, at 275 ("But in this judicially constructed alternative universe-where
a reasonable person is presumed to notice terms that are buried in hyperlinks-the courts apply
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even where the drafter makes unilateral changes and does not receive a
renewed consent, as the prior clickwrap typically contains a term that
allows for these unilateral changes, no matter what they may be. 47
For browsewraps, which are often called "terms of use" or "policies"
and are displayed via a hyperlink found all the way at the bottom of the
webpage, courts similarly enforce these agreements.4 8 Courts have
consistently held that these terms of use can be enforceable contracts if
the users had adequate notice of them, even if the user never had to
manifest assent or even read the terms.49
Although courts may differentiate between the two types of
agreements when testing for mutual assent, courts equally equate these
online agreements to offline agreements. 50 Therefore, the only inquiry
that a court typically undertakes in an online agreement dispute is
whether sufficient notice of the terms was given. 5 1 For example, in
Specht v. Netscape, the court held that where the consumers did not
have sufficient notice of the terms of the online agreement, it was
unenforceable. 5 2 However, where websites provide sufficient notice of
terms (even where the agreement is entered into after a purchase or
browsing session), these contracts will be held enforceable under the
objective theory of contracting. 53 Instead of manifesting assent through
some reasonable person's actions, such as signing a paper document,
courts have held that retaining a purchased product or one's continued
use of a website suffices as assent. 54 The same reasoning of efficiency
and business efficacy is used by many courts to justify the extension of
the objective theory to online agreements.
The enforceability of these online agreements allows website owners
to insert terms that are unilaterally beneficial for the owners. 5 5 A
the duty to read."); Juliet M. Moringiello, Signals, Assent and Internet Contracting, 57 RUTGERS
L. REv. 1307, 1320 (2005).
47. Knapp, supra note 8, at 329.
48. KIM, supra note 8, at 41; Christina L. Kunz, et al., Browse-Wrap Agreements: Validity of
Implied Assent in Electronic Form Agreement, 59 BUS. L. 279, 290 (2003).
49. See Moringiello, supra note 46, at 1320 ("Because the courts tend to see no factual
difference between paper and electronic contracts, they tend to hold that whenever a paper form
reasonably communicates its terms, the analogous electronic form communicates its terms.").
50. Id.
51. KIM, supra note 8, at 43.
52. Specht v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 29-30 (2d Cir. 2002).
53. KiM, supra note 8, at 43.
54. See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 402 (2d Cir. 2004); supra note
15; see also ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that the use
of the software was sufficient to consent to the agreement and that the consumer could have
simply returned the computer).
55. Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Wolves of the World Wide Web: Reforming
Social Networks' Contracting Parties, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1431, 1450 (2014) (undertaking
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number of scholars and commentators have differentiated online
agreements from offline agreements by calling out the types of harmful
terms that online agreements include. 56 Many of these agreements
include a waiver of one's right to litigate any dispute with the website
owner, as well as an agreement to submit to binding arbitration. 57 Other
agreements include forum selection clauses, which require website users
to submit to exclusive jurisdiction in areas far from their homes,
disincentivizing users to bring lawsuits.5 8 In addition, many online
agreements now contain clauses related to intellectual property, such as
trademarks, which will be explored next.
B. How Do Trademarks Enter into the Mix?
More and more, websites are including intellectual property-related
terms in online agreements with their site users. For example, a brief
survey of the top fifty websites in the United States (as determined by
Alexa) shows that all but four sites have some form of intellectual
property-related term included in their online agreements. 59 This is
understandable with respect to copyright, as many online websites are
subject to the "notice and take down" provisions of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA"), which requires that Internet
intermediaries respond to copyright violation notifications. 6 0 Due to
this, many websites include clauses similar to eBay's regarding the
requirement that users not infringe on others' copyrights, as well as how
the website will respond to notifications of infringement: "We respond
to notices of alleged copyright infringement under the United States

an empirical study of social media sites and finding in part that social networks' online
agreements are excessively one-sided).
56. See Preston & McCann, supra note 4, at 19-20 (finding onerous provisions in a survey of
eight online service providers); Rustad & Koenig, supra note 55, at 1502 (finding that social
media sites include provisions that violate EU regulations on fair contract provisions).
57. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 55, at 1467-68.
58. See, e.g., CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1268 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that
the Texas-based defendant agreed to forum in Ohio, the plaintiffs place of business and
acknowledging that "[i]t may be burdensome for Patterson to defend a suit in Ohio, but he knew
when he entered into the Shareware Registration Agreement with CompuServe that he was
making a connection with Ohio, and presumably he hoped that connection would work to his
benefit").
59. See Top Sites in United States, ALEXA, http://www.alexa.com/topsites/countries/US (last
visited Mar. 29, 2016) (survey results on file with author).
60. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(2012) ("The limitations on liability established by this section shall
apply to a service provider only if the service provider-(A) has adopted and reasonably
implemented, and informs subscribers and account holders of the service provider's system or
network of, a policy that provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers
and account holders of the service provider's system or network who are repeat infringers; and
(B) accommodates and does not interfere with standard technical measures.").
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Digital Millennium Copyright Act. eBay's Verified Rights Owner
(VeRO) program works to ensure that listed items do not infringe upon
the copyright, trademark or other intellectual property rights of third
parties." 6 1
With respect to other types of intellectual property, such as trademark
rights, the inclusion is less understandable from a statutory perspective,
as the DMCA does not apply to trademark law. 6 2 In addition, there is
currently no counterpart to the "notice and take down" requirement of
the DMCA in any other federal trademark statute. Notwithstanding
this, forty-four out of the top fifty websites include some type of
trademark-related provision. 63
Similar to the copyright-related
provisions, the trademark-related provisions are concerned with
infringements of others' trademark rights, as well as the website's
rights. For example, Amazon's online agreement states: "Amazon's
trademarks and trade dress may not be used in connection with any
product or service that is not Amazon's, in any manner that is likely to
cause confusion among customers, or in any manner that disparages or
discredits Amazon." 64
These clauses are more understandable, however, in a world where
online agreements are generally held to be enforceable. 65 After all,
trademarks are typically among the most valuable type of asset for
online companies. 66 For example, the trademark "Google" has been
valued at $113 billion and is the company's most valuable asset. 6 7
Therefore, it is prudent for companies to take steps to protect their
valuable assets, including by contract. Nonetheless, the problem with
these clauses and their enforceability is that they may have an
unintentional impact on other areas of the law, such as trademark law
61. eBay User Agreement, EBAY (June 15, 2015), http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/useragreement.html.
62. H.R. REP. No. 105-796, at 63 (1998) (Conf. Rep.) (explaining that the DMCA was enacted
in order to implement the World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty and
Performances and Phonograms Treaty).
63. Supra note 59 and accompanying text.
64. Amazon TOS, supra note 2.
65. Unconscionability, the one doctrine that could have an impact on the enforcement of
online agreements has been rarely used to do so. Scholars have argued for the need to adjust the
doctrine to better apply to the world of online contracting. See KIM, supra note 8, at 207-10
(arguing for a holistic view of unconscionability); Gibson, supra note 9, at 218-24 (arguing for a
change in the doctrine).
66. See Leah Chan Grinvald, Trademark Law and Theory: A Handbook of Contemporary
Research, 2 IP L. BOOK REv. 23, 23 (2011) (book review) (citing to half of Apple, Inc.'s
valuation based on its trademark portfolio).
67. Eric Goldman, Google Successfully Defends Its Most Valuable Asset in Court, FORBES
(Sept. 15, 2014, 12:11 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2014/09/15/google-success
fully-defends-its-most-valuable-asset-in-court/.
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and the doctrine concerning fame of a trademark. This is particularly
the case where online companies attempt to obtain recognition of less
well-known trademarks or non-dominant portions of their trademarks
through online agreements.
II. FAME AND TRADEMARK LAW

The rise in the importance of fame in trademark law began around the
turn of the twentieth century, tracking the rise in the importance of
trademarks more generally.68 Whereas in the eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries, Americans mainly lived in rural areas, the mid to
late nineteenth century witnessed an explosion in urban living, due in
large part to the Industrial Revolution. 69 Business models were also
altered, to keep up with changed living patterns. When Americans lived
in rural areas, they shopped locally and relied on their local shopkeepers
to provide quality and consistency guarantees of the wares they sold.70
With Americans living in large, urban areas, the intimacy and trust in a
local shopkeeper gave way to anonymous, large chain department
stores. 7 1 This necessitated the rise in the importance of a trademark to
signify quality and consistency. 72 Instead of a local shopkeeper to
inform the consumer about the qualities of the product, the trademark
and its related advertising did that in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. 73
By the early twentieth century, household brand names, like "Rolls
Royce," "Aunt Jemima," and "Kodak," had developed in the United
68. See Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV.
813, 825 (1927) ("The more distinctive or unique the mark, the deeper is its impress upon the
public consciousness, and the greater its need for protection against vitiation or dissociation from
the particular product in connection with which it has been used.").
69.

JAMES D. NORRIS, ADVERTISING AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN SOCIETY:

1865-1920, at 4-10 (1990) (providing tab!- showing the growth of urban populations from 1870
to 1920); DANIEL POPE, THE MAKING OF MODERN ADVERTISING 34-35 (1983); PAMELA
WALKER LAIRD, ADVERTISING PROGRESS: AMERICAN BUSINESS AND THE RISE OF CONSUMER
MARKETING 31 (2001) ("The second stage of industrialization, approximately 1870-1900, with
its surge of invention and increased productivity, coincided with a dramatic expansion of world
trade and provided the context for new developments in the marketplace.").
70. See Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in
Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547, 575 (2006) ("In this world of local rural communities,
goodwill tended to attach to individual persons or small shops.").
71. LAIRD, supra note 69, at 26-27.
72. Bone, supra note 70, at 577-78.
73. See STUART EWEN, CAPTAINS OF CONSCIOUSNESS: ADVERTISING AND THE SOCIAL
ROOTS OF THE CONSUMER CULTURE 46-48 (1976); ROLAND MARCHAND, ADVERTISING THE
AMERICAN DREAM: MAKING WAY FOR MODERNITY, 1920-1940, at tO (1983) ("To induce
consumers to read advertising copy that was often long and argumentative, the advertiser-assalesman was encouraged to use imagination and a 'human-interest' approach to appeal to their
emotions.").
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States, but trademark law doctrine had not kept pace. 74 This meant that
where "Borden's" was used only for condensed milk, a competitor
could use "Borden's" for ice cream, as traditional doctrine limited
trademark protection to identical product categories. 75 Frank Schechter,
writing in the 1920s, railed against this in his now-famous article, The
Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, which was a call to protect
famous marks against unauthorized dilutive uses. 76
Courts and
legislatures paid attention, and the mid to late twentieth century saw a
rise in the attention paid to the fame of a trademark, also referred to as
"trademark strength" or "acquired distinctiveness." 7 7 The thinking
developed that a strong or famous trademark deserved extra legal
protection in either confusingly similar uses or in dilutive ones.78
A. On the Importance ofBeing Famous
Fame is important in two areas of trademark law. The first is in
straightforward trademark infringement cases, where the plaintiff seeks
to enforce its rights in a trademark against a defendant who has
allegedly been using either the same or a confusingly similar
trademark. 79 In these types of cases, the infringement standard is the
"likelihood of confusion," and fame appears as one of the factors that
judges need to consider in the multifactor analysis.8 0 The second is in
74. Schechter, supra note 68, at 813 ("[F]orward strides in trademark protection are being
attained by appeals to 'good conscience' and 'judicial sensibilities' rather than to strictly legal
principles derived from a critical analysis of the real tort involved.").
75. Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden's Condensed Milk Co., 201 F. 510, 514 (7th Cir. 1912)
("The secondary meaning of a name, however, has no legal significance, unless the two persons
make or deal in the same kind of goods. Clearly the appellants here could make gloves, or plows,
or cutlery, under the name 'Borden' without infringing upon any property right of the old
company. If that is true, they can make anything under the name 'Borden' which the appellee has
not already made and offered to the public.").
76. Schechter, supra note 68, at 825-33.
77. See Lisa Larrimore Ouellete, The Google Shortcut to Trademark Law, 102 CALIF. L. REV.
351, 359 (2014). Trademark strength is also used to refer to "inherent distinctiveness," which is
how unique a mark is from its inception. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763,
774 (1992).
The spectrum of inherent distinctiveness ranges from generic, descriptive,
suggestive, fanciful, to arbitrary. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9
(2d Cir. 1976). A trademark that is strong because it is inherently distinctive is not automatically
famous. I focus solely on the acquisition of fame in this Article and as mentioned earlier, I use
the terms "fame" and "strength" interchangeably and to refer to acquired distinctiveness.
78. Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming Trademark Bullies, 2011 Wis. L. REV. 627, 638.
79. McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 255 (1877) ("Where the similarity is sufficient to
convey a false impression to the public mind, and is of a character to mislead and deceive the
ordinary purchaser in the exercise of ordinary care and caution in such matters, it is sufficient to
give the injured party a right to redress.").
80. Each of the thirteen federal circuits has its own multifactor test for likelihood of
confusion; however, each test includes a factor that examines the strength of the trademark at
issue. See Beebe, supra note 16, at 1589 ("Common to all of the circuits' tests are four factors:
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dilution cases, where the plaintiff seeks to enjoin the use by the
defendant of the plaintiffs trademark (either an identical use or one that
is similar enough to give rise to an association) on noncompeting
products. 81 Fame is the threshold element in dilution cases, as only
famous trademarks are allowed to enjoy antidilution protection. 8 2
1. Fame in Trademark Infringement Cases
The standard for trademark infringement is whether the defendant's
use of the trademark at issue would likely be confused with the
In order to assess this "likelihood of
plaintiff's trademark. 8 3
confusion," judges utilize a multifactor test that varies among the
federal circuits and can range from as little as six factors to as many as
thirteen. 84 Although the tests differ from circuit to circuit, one of the
factors that is consistently analyzed is the "strength" factor.85
"Strength" is used to refer to both inherent distinctiveness and acquired
distinctiveness. 86 Inherent distinctiveness is the type of trademark at
hand, often placed on a spectrum of protectability, from generic and
descriptive (obtaining no protection unless it has gained secondary
meaning), to suggestive, arbitrary, or fanciful. 87 This type of strength is
not the same as fame, as fame in trademark infringement cases is
correlated to market strength.8 8 Although courts are typically required
the similarity of the marks, the proximity of the goods, evidence of actual confusion, and the
strength of the plaintiff's mark.").
81. 15U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2012).
82. Id. § 1125(c)(1) ("Subject to the principles of equity, the owner of a famous mark that is
distinctive, inherently or through acquired distinctiveness, shall be entitled to an injunction
against another person who, at any time after the owner's mark has become famous, commences
use of a mark or trade name in commerce that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by
tarnishment of the famous mark, regardless of the presence or absence of actual or likely
confusion, of competition, or of actual economic injury").
83. MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 23:12 ("The test of infringement is the likelihood of
confusion, not the proof of actual confusion.").
84.

See GRAEME DINWOODIE & MARK JANIS, TRADEMARK & UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW

521-23 (4th ed. 2014) (providing chart of all thirteen circuits' likelihood of confusion multifactor
tests).
85. Beebe, supra note 16, at 1589.
86. See supra note 77 (describing the concept of trademark strength).
87. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976) ("The
cases, and in some instances the Lanham Act, identify four different categories of terms with
respect to trademark protection. Arrayed in an ascending order which roughly reflects their
eligibility to trademark status and the degree of protection accorded, these classes are (1) generic,
(2) descriptive, (3) suggestive, and (4) arbitrary or fanciful."); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Samara Bros. 529 U.S. 205, 210 (2000) ("[A] mark is inherently distinctive if '[its] intrinsic
nature serves to identify a particular source."' (citing Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana Inc., 505
U.S. 763, 768 (1992))).
88. MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 11:83 ("Many arbitrary and suggestive terms may be
conceptually and inherently strong, but if they receive little publicity through only meager
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to assess both forms of distinctiveness for the strength factor, 89 there is

evidence to suggest that acquired distinctiveness, or fame, is more
heavily weighted. 90
In fact, Professor Barton Beebe's groundbreaking empirical analysis
of the multifactor likelihood of confusion test shows that having a court
determine that a trademark is strong in the marketplace can heavily
influence the results of a case. Out of the 192 preliminary injunction
and bench trials sampled for his study, Professor Beebe found that
where the plaintiff lost the strength factor, the plaintiff would also lose
the case, with the court finding no likelihood of confusion. 91 In
addition, Professor Beebe found that in some cases, a finding of
acquired strength could trump a finding of inherent weakness. 92 From
these results, Professor Beebe concluded that federal district courts (at
least in practice) have acknowledged that a mark's inherent strength is
an element of that mark's marketplace strength. 93 Based on this,
Professor Beebe advocates that courts should simply analyze the
marketplace strength, or level of fame, when assessing the strength
factor.94
Given the importance of the level of fame of a trademark in the
likelihood of confusion multifactor test analysis, what does a famous
mark give you? In a nutshell: strong trademark protection, which
comes in two forms. The first is in the lowered burden on the part of
the strong trademark holder to prove a likelihood of confusion. Where a
plaintiffs trademark has acquired a good level of market strength,
courts are more likely to presume a likelihood of confusion. 95 For
example, in Virgin Enterprises, Inc. v. Nawab, although the Second

Circuit went through all six of its likelihood of confusion factors, it gave

advertising and feeble sales, they are relatively weak marks in the place where it counts: the
marketplace.").
89. Brennan's, Inc. v. Brennan's Rest., L.L.C., 360 F.3d 125, 131 (2d Cir. 2004).
90. Beebe, supra note 16, at 1636 ("Though most appellate courts have not yet come around
to acknowledging it, district courts appear in practice to have recognized that the mark's acquired
or 'actual strength' in the marketplace logically incorporates the effects of the mark's inherent
strength.").
91. Id. at 1608 (explaining that out of the fifty-three cases where plaintiff lost the strength
factor, plaintiff also lost the case in fifty of the cases).
92. Id. at 1636 ("[C]ourts found marks to be inherently weak but commercially strong in
twenty-three of the opinions sampled. In twenty-two of these opinions, the court found that the
strength factor favored confusion.").
93. Id.
94. Id. ("Indeed, the results suggest that courts need not even consider inherent strength in
their assessment of the strength factor, or that if they do, inherent strength should properly be
understood as merely one factor . . . .").
95. McCARTHY, supra note 10, § 11:73.
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great weight to the fact that the plaintiffs "Virgin" trademark was well
known among consumers. 96 As such, the court found a likelihood of
confusion, even with evidence of which other courts are more skeptical
(such as affidavits from former employees of defendants to prove actual
confusion).97
The second boon a strong trademark obtains is the "larger cloak of
protection." 9 8 This means that based on the level of marketplace
strength, courts will allow a strong trademark to enjoin third-party uses
in not only competing goods, but in other related and even unrelated
markets, as well. 99 This is the case even where the plaintiff has not
entered the related or unrelated market. For example, in Elvis Presley
Enterprises, Inc. v. Capece, the Fifth Circuit found that the defendant's
use of the mark "Velvet Elvis" as a restaurant and bar name was likely
to be confused with "Elvis" for entertainment services. 10 0 The court
concluded that due to the fame of the mark, "Elvis," consumers would
likely confuse the two, even though the plaintiff did not operate a
restaurant (it only offered food at the Elvis Presley museum).] 0
These two forms of expanded protection provide a famous trademark
with wide-ranging powers to exclude almost all uses of third-party
marks that may be confusingly similar to it. Perhaps due in part to this,
the United States has witnessed an explosion of trademark litigation in
the past few decades, as well as a rise in abusive threats of trademark
litigation. Trademark holders are under the misapprehension that every
third-party use of a trademark must be stopped, or else their trademarks
will not be considered strong. Unfortunately, the courts have had a
hand in this, as one of the factors in determining whether a mark is
96. Virgin Enters., Inc. v. Nawab, 335 F.3d 141, 149 (2003) ("The mark had been employed
with world-wide recognition as the mark of an airline and as the mark for megastores selling
music recordings and consumer electronic equipment. The fame of the mark increased the
likelihood that consumers seeing defendants' shops selling telephones under the mark VIRGIN
would assume incorrectly that defendants' shops were a part of plaintiff's organization.").
97. "Plaintiff submitted to the district court an affidavit of a former employee of defendant
Cel-Net, who worked at a mall kiosk branded as Virgin Wireless, which stated that individuals
used to ask him if the kiosk was affiliated with plaintiff's VIRGIN stores." Id. at 151.
98. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. R. Seelig & Hille, 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 856, 860 (T.T.A.B.
1978) ("[T]he law today rewards a famous or well-known mark with a larger cloak of protection
than in the case of a lesser known mark because of the tendency of the consuming public to
associate a relatively unknown mark with one to which they have long been exposed if the mark
bears any resemblance thereto.").
99. MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 11:73; see also Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna,
Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REv. 413, 418-19 (2010) (discussing example cases).
100. Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 203 (5th Cir. 1998).
101. Id. ("The pervasiveness of EPE's marks across the spectrum of products and the success
and proliferation of entertainment and music-themed restaurants like Planet Hollywood and Hard
Rock Caf6-which Capece testified inspired their parody-support a likelihood of confusion.").
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strong in the marketplace is examining the number of other uses of the
mark. For example, where the mark "Domino" was used for a variety
of different products, not just sugar, the trademark holder of "Domino"
for sugar was unable to enjoin the defendant from using the same mark
for pizza delivery services. 1 02 In addition, there is difficulty in proving
marketplace strength, as the factors that courts use to assess strength in
the marketplace are wide-ranging and not given uniform weight, which
will be discussed further in Section B, infra. As I will argue in Part III,
this can lead to a use of contracts in an attempt to bolster an argument of
fame, particularly where an entity desires to obtain dilution protection,
which will be discussed next.
2. Fame in Dilution Cases
Unlike a case of trademark infringement, a case of dilution does not
require a plaintiff to prove a likelihood of confusion.10 3 Rather, a
plaintiff must prove a likelihood of dilution; but before a plaintiff can
make its case of dilution, it must prove that its mark is famous. 104
"Fame" under dilution law is slightly different from fame, or trademark
strength, in trademark infringement law. Professor Thomas McCarthy
has likened fame under dilution as an "on/off switch."1 0 5 A trademark
is either famous for purposes of dilution, or it is not. Further, unlike
fame in trademark infringement law, federal dilution law has a statutory
definition of a famous trademark: "[A] mark is famous if it is widely
recognized by the general consuming public of the United States as a
designation of source of the goods or services of the mark's owner." 106
In addition, there are four statutory factors for a court to use in order to
assess fame: (1) the length of time and breadth of advertising of the
trademark (either by the trademark holder or others); (2) the sales of the
trademarked product; (3) whether the mark has actual fame and to what
extent; and (4) whether the mark is registered.1 0 7
If a markholder can prove that its trademark is famous, the benefits of
dilution are wide ranging. Dilution provides the markholder with the
ability to enjoin uses of other trademarks that may dilute the famous
mark either through blurring or tamishment.10 8 Many scholars have
102. Amstar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252, 260 (5th Cir. 1980) ("The thirdparty uses and registrations discussed above merely limit the protection to be accorded plaintiff's
mark outside the uses to which plaintiff has already put its mark.").
103. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2012) (providing for a "likely to cause dilution" standard).
104. Id
105. Id § 1125(c)(2)(A).
106. Id
107. Id
108. Id. § 1125(c)(1).
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bemoaned these benefits as over-expansive and have called these
developments in trademark law the "propertization" of trademarks. 109
This means that trademarks have become a thing unto themselves to
protect, rather than just the reputation of the trademark. Perhaps due in
part to this, fame for purposes of dilution is supposed to be an extremely
hard thing to prove in court or in U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
proceedings.1 10 This is particularly the case since Congress amended
the federal dilution law in 2006, and statutorily mandated that fame was
based on a nationwide standard, not simply based on regional or niche
fame. 11 1 As the Federal Circuit has opined, "[i]t is well-established that
dilution fame is difficult to prove.""l 2
B. On the Difficulty ofProving Fame
Fame is difficult to prove in two aspects. The first aspect is that
courts place fame at a premium, requiring compelling evidence to prove
fame, as the Federal Circuit indicated in the quote above. The second
aspect is that good, direct evidence of fame is hard to come by. The
reason for this is that direct evidence would typically come in the form
of consumer testimony-whether consumers themselves view the mark
as one that is famous. 113 Because a mark's fame is based on the breadth
and reach of the mark's recognition, one can imagine that quite a
number of consumers would have to testify in order to have such
evidence be probative. As it is highly unlikely that any trademark
holder would be able to afford this type of testimony, a shortcut for this
has been the consumer survey.11 4 With a consumer survey, consumer
109. See Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108
YALE L.J. 1687, 1693-94 (1998-99). See generally Glynn S. Lunney, Trademark Monopolies,
48 EMORY L.J. 367 (1999); Dev S. Gangjee, Propertyin Brands, in CONCEPTS OF PROPERTY IN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 29 (Helena Howe & Jonathan Griffiths eds., 2013) (discussing
the propertization trend in Europe more broadly, not just with respect to dilution).
110. Barton Beebe, A Defense of the New FederalTrademarkAntidilution Law, 16 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1143, 1158 n.86 (2006) ("The [new federal trademark
antidilution law] is simply not intended to protect trademarks whose fame is at all in doubt."); see
also MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 24:104.
111. MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 24:105 ("One of the purposes of the 2006 [Trademark
Dilution Revision Act] statutory revisions was to prevent courts from labeling a mark as 'famous'
because it was well-known only in a local geographical territory or in a local product or service
line.").
112. Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(holding that the mark "COACH" for luxury handbags was not famous for dilution purposes).
113. Greene & Wilkerson, supra note II, at 537 ("[Wjhat matters most is how consumers in
the marketplace react to the mark.").
114. Graeme W. Austin, Tolerating Confusion About Confusion: Trademark Policiesand Fair
Use, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 157, 169 (2008) ("Sometimes, courts do find out about the mental
impressions of real people-through consumer surveys and the like."); see also MCCARTHY,
supra note 10, § 11:83 ("Determining the strength of any mark requires weighing either or both
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psychologists devise questions and sampling methods in order to
extrapolate the percentage of consumers that recognize the trademark
(and perhaps to what extent).115 The problem with this method is that
surveys are often flawed and judges (as well as opposing counsel) are
able to find holes and problems with many surveys such that they are
not always probative evidence. 116
With direct evidence of fame being so difficult to obtain, courts often
rely on a variety of different factors and evidence in order to
circumstantially assess the acquired strength or fame of a particular
mark. 1 1 7 Where a court is assessing the strength of a mark under a
confusion analysis, the factors it uses are not mandated by statute.
Rather, these factors are the same used to analyze whether a descriptive
mark has acquired sufficient distinctiveness to be considered a
trademark, or what is termed as "secondary meaning." 1 8 The idea
behind secondary meaning is that consumers can come to recognize
certain trademarks through activities undertaken by the trademark
holder, including sales of products, advertising, and the extent and
nature of the trademark use.1 19 Although the term secondary meaning
was traditionally used to refer to the threshold of distinctiveness that a
descriptive term needed to have in order to become a trademark, the
term is often used interchangeably with "acquired distinctiveness." In
turn, "acquired distinctiveness" is used interchangeably with the terms
trademark strength or fame.
In essence, the strength of a trademark for purposes of the likelihood
of confusion analysis is on a spectrum from weak to very strong.1 2 0 As
circumstantial evidence of advertising and promotion and direct evidence of consumer
recognition, such as by a survey.").
115. See Irina D. Manta, In Search of Validity: A New Model for the Content and Procedural
Treatment of Trademark Infringement Surveys, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1027, 1036-37
(2007-08) (discussing surveys in the context of measuring likelihood of confusion).
116. See, e.g., Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 797 (5th Cir.
1983), abrogated by KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression, Inc., 543 U.S. 111
(2004) ("This survey provides us with nothing more than some data regarding fish friers'
perceptions about products used for frying chicken. As such, it is entitled to little evidentiary
weight.").
117. MCCARTHY,supra note 10, § 11:83.
118. See Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Co., 920 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1097 (N.D. Cal. 2013),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 786 F.3d 983 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ("Although secondary meaning and
fame are different issues, here they rise and fall on largely the same evidence."); see also Greene
& Wilkerson, supra note 11, at 555 ("We argue that the evidence relevant to those two
inquiries-acquired strength and secondary meaning-is not just similar but in fact identical.").
119. Zatarains, 698 F.2d at 795 ("Factors such as amount and manner of advertising, volume
of sales, and length and manner of use may serve as circumstantial evidence relevant to the issue
of secondary meaning.").
120. MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 11:75 (providing the "Strength Thermometer").
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mentioned above, however, where a court is assessing the fame of a
mark under a dilution analysis, the factors are statutorily mandated,
although some bear resemblance to those discussed under secondary
meaning.121

While these activities appear easy to document for trademark holders,
some courts scrutinize evidence that is provided to prove acquired
distinctiveness. The courts parse through these factors in order to
ascertain whether, and to what extent, consumers have "establish[ed]
the necessary link in the minds of consumers between a product and its
source."1 22 Recent cases where trademarks were not found famous
provide evidence that courts are strictly scrutinizing evidence brought
by trademark holders. For example, in the Apple, Inc. v. Amazon.com,
Inc. dispute over the term "App Store," the court found that even though
Apple had produced substantial amounts of evidence to attempt to prove
its mark was famous, it was not enough.1 23 The court stated, "[t]he
mark does appear to enjoy widespread recognition, but it is not clear
from the evidence whether it is recognition as a trademark or
recognition as a descriptive term." 1 24 Perhaps due in part to this, online
companies are looking to new avenues, such as online agreements and
consumer behavior, as a way to bolster evidence of strength or fame.
III. CONTRACTING TRADEMARK FAME?

As discussed above, courts are typically required to use proxies in
order to assess the real strength or fame of a trademark in consumers'
eyes. These proxies include a number of different factors, such as sales,
advertising dollars spent, and the length and breadth of trademark
use. 1 2 5 The problem with these factors (particularly if the trademark use
is more recent) is that they do not always shed light on the connection
between the consumer and the trademark. 12 6 Combined with the fact
that strength or fame is supposed to be a high hurdle to cross, it appears
that more recently, courts have been amenable to utilizing other types of
evidence, such as the number of website users or smartphone and tablet
121. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (2012), with Zatarains, 698 F.2d at 795 (illustrating
that while the statute allows for consideration of all relevant factors, case law makes clear that no
one factor is determinative, and that other circumstantial evidence may be considered as well).
122. Id.
123. Apple, Inc. v. Amazon.com Inc., No. C 11-1327 PJH, 2011 WL 2638191, at *11 (N.D.
Cal. July 6, 2011).
124. Id.
125. Zatarains, 698 F.2d at 795.
126. Robert G. Bone, Taking the Confusion Out of "Likelihood of Confuision ": Toward a
More Sensible Approach to Trademark Infringement, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. 1307, 1343 (2012)
("The problem is that mark strength has no obvious relationship to likely confusion.").
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application downloads, as ways to prove strength or fame through
commercial success. 12 7
This is generally a positive development as it fits in with my
suggestion to adopt an interactive theory of consumer recognition,
which will be discussed further in Part IV.
Nonetheless, this
development can be problematic where a plaintiff argues that nondominant trademarks or portions of their trademarks are separately
famous, simply based on the number of users they have or downloads
they receive. 128 Part of the premise on which this argument may
implicitly rely is that these users have agreed to acknowledge the
plaintiffs trademarks through the online agreement they entered into
when they first signed up. 129 For example, in Facebook's enforcement
efforts at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, the company has
argued that "FBook" and "Book" are separately famous trademarks
based in part on having over one billion users. 1 30 While this argument
has traction with respect to the dominant trademark "Facebook," it has
much less traction with respect to the individual portions of the
dominant mark, or even abbreviations that are not used on the website.
In this Part, I will explore further these recent developments, and then
turn to my arguments against the potential extension of the objective
theory of contract law to trademark law.
A. Recent Developments
The use of contracts to restrict third-party uses of one's trademarks,
or even to acquire recognition of one's marks, is not a new
development. Traditionally, these types of clauses are included in
licensing situations, such as where a franchisor has licensed its
trademarks to a franchisee, 131 or where a manufacturer contracts with
127. See, e.g., Treemo, Inc. v. Flipboard, Inc., 53 F. Supp. 3d 1342, 1355 (W.D. Wash. 2014)
(using Flipboard's app downloads as evidence of trademark strength). In addition, some scholars
have argued for more technologically savvy ways to test for consumer recognition of trademarks,
such as the search hierarchy on Google; see also Ouellete, supra note 77, at 357.
128. See supra note 13 (discussing Facebook's arguments in U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office oppositions).
129. In addition, it appears to be the basis for which some companies discontinue the alleged
infringer's account, such as when Facebook threatened to discontinue Lamebook's account on
Facebook. See Mandour & Associates, Lamebook to Keep Name After Trademark Dispute with
Facebook, INTELL. PROP. NEWS.COM (Aug. 29, 2011), http://www.intellectualpropertynews.com/
trademark-news/lamebook-to-keep-name-in-trademark-dispute-with-facebook/.
130. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
131. See, e.g., Dunkin Donuts Franchising LLC v. Claudia Ill, LLC, No. 14-2293, 2015 WL
4243534, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 14, 2015) ("Plaintiffs and Defendants entered into a Franchise
Agreement in 2009. Pursuant to this contract, Plaintiffs granted Defendants a license to use
Plaintiffs' trademarks and trade dress and permitted Defendants to receive other forms of
logistical and marketing support from Plaintiffs.").
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distribution partners. These agreements typically include trademark
licensing provisions (or incorporate separate license agreements) and
disputes may arise as to the scope of the use of the licensed marks,
particularly after termination of the agreement.1 3 2
With the proliferation of online agreements, it is not surprising that
these types of provisions or possible uses of contractual provisions in
offline agreements are making their way into online oneS.133 As I
mentioned briefly above in Part I.B, forty-four out of fifty of the top
U.S. websites I surveyed have some sort of trademark-related provision
in their online agreements.1 34 These can be broken down into three
different categories: (1) the specific listing of marks; (2) the "catch all"
provision; and (3) the catch all with branding guidelines. Although I
break these clauses into three different categories, a number of the
online agreements combine one or more of these categories.1 35
Here are some examples of these provisions in order to ground the
discussion. First, the specific listing of marks can be found in the
Amazon online agreement (called "Conditions of Use") where the
trademark-related provision states: "Click here to see a non-exhaustive
list of Amazon trademarks. In addition, graphics, logos, page headers,
button icons, scripts, and service names included in or made available
through any Amazon Service are trademarks or trade dress of Amazon
in the U.S. and other countries." 1 36 Clicking on the link brings you to
132. See, e.g., id. ("Shortly after terminating the Franchise Agreement, Plaintiffs filed this
lawsuit. The lawsuit alleges Defendants breached the Franchise Agreement and continued to
operate their store and use Plaintiffs intellectual property without a license to do so, in violation
of federal trademark and unfair competition law."); Coldwell Banker Real Estate, LLC v. DC
Prop. & Loans, Inc., No. C 13-4732 SBA, 2014 WL 5474584, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2014). In
Coldwell Banker the franchise agreement between plaintiff and defendant stated:
Paragraph 14.3 of the Franchise Agreement, entitled "Discontinuance of the Franchised
Business' sets forth Defendants" obligations in the event of termination of the
Franchise Agreement, including: (1) not directly or indirectly at any time or in any
manner identifying themselves or their business as a current or former franchise of
Coldwell Banker; (2) not using any of the Coldwell Banker@ Marks or any imitation
thereof, (3) canceling fictitious name registrations related to Defendants' use of the
COLDWELL BANKER® Marks; (4) giving written notice to the telephone company
and all telephone directory publishers of the termination of Defendants' right to use the
COLDWELL BANKER® Marks in connection with any telephone number or listing;
and (5) immediately discontinuing use, for any purpose, of all signs, advertising
materials, and other materials or supplies which display or include the COLDWELL
BANKER® Marks.
Coldwell Banker Real Estate, LLC, 2014 WL 5474584, at *3.
133. Kim, supra note 9, at 275 (discussing the cyclical nature of online-offline agreements).
134. See Top Sites in United States, supra note 59.
135. See,
e.g., Apple
Website
Terms of Use,
APPLE, http://www.apple.com/
legal/internet-services/terms/site.html (last updated Nov. 20, 2009).
136. Amazon TOS, supra note 2.
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another webpage where Amazon lists approximately 462 trademarks
that it claims ownership over. 137 Second, the "catch all" provision
refers to the use of the online company to claim everything and
anything on their website as a trademark (or trade dress), such as
Twitter's "Terms of Service" clause: "Nothing in the Terms gives you a
right to use the Twitter name or any of the Twitter trademarks, logos,
domain names, and other distinctive brand features." 13 8 And finally, the
catch all provision plus brand guidelines includes a broad statement of
trademark rights, as well as provides a link to do's and don'ts of the
company's trademarks. An example of this third category of trademark
provisions can be found in Tumblr's "Terms of Service," which state:
"Any use of Tumblr's trademarks, branding, logos, and other such
assets in connection with the Services shall use Tumbir's approved
branding and shall be in accordance with the Tumblr Trademark
Guidelines." 1 3 9 Clicking on the Tumblr "Trademark Guidelines" takes
you to another webpage that provides the ability to download specific
marks, such as the "t" icon, as well as rules for the downloader to abide
by. 140
It is unclear what is primarily motivating the inclusion of these
provisions into online agreements. One possible reason could be that it
is simply rational for a company's lawyer to include these provisions
into the online agreement because there are no negative legal
consequences for doing so, or that they are similar to clauses that appear
in offline agreements. 14 1 In fact, because trademarks are such valuable
intellectual property rights, it could be that not including these
trademark-related provisions would be considered negligent. With
respect to category one, the specific listing of trademarks, as well as
category three, the catch all plus brand guidelines, it could also be that
companies are attempting to put the world on notice that they are
claiming rights to certain marks, similar to the way a trademark marking
("TM" or "@") puts the world on notice of rights. 14 2
If these were the only possible reasons behind the inclusion of these
provisions, they would not necessarily be problematic. Yet, based on
137. Id.
138. Twitter Terms of Service, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/tos?lang=en (last updated Jan. 27,
2016).
139. Terms of Service, TUMBLR, https://www.tumblr.com/policy/en/terms-of-service (last
updated Jan. 27, 2014).
140. Using the Logo, TUMBLR, https://www.tumblr.com/logo (last visited Mar. 29, 2016).
141. See supra notes 131 & 132.
142. 15 U.S.C. § 1111 (2012); U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRADEMARK MANUAL
OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE 906 (2015), https://mpep.uspto.gov/RDMS/TMEP/current#/current/
TMEP-900dlel285.html ("Federal Registration Notice").
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the types of trademarks included in the category one provisions and the
legal arguments that some trademark holders are making in trademark
opposition proceedings at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, there
seems to be a problematic reason for including these provisions into
online agreements. First, some mark holders are claiming not only
dominant marks, but also non-dominant marks that appear on the
holders' websites. An example of this is Amazon's claimed mark for
"A to Z."143 Second, some trademark holders are arguing that portions
of their dominant marks are famous based on the number of website
users they have. As mentioned above, an example of this is Facebook's
argument that "Fbook" and "Book" are separately famous marks based
in part on their number of users. 144 Therefore, it would appear that
some trademark holders are including these provisions in order to
implicitly underscore their arguments of trademark fame for nondominant trademarks or separate portions of their dominant marks.
Perhaps more problematic is that there are hints that courts (including
the Trademark Trial and Appellate Board) are accepting these
arguments and perhaps are even finding them persuasive. In the past
year or so, there have been cases that provide support for this trend.
One recent case utilized a license agreement with a well-known entity to
prove the validity and strength of its trademark. In the House of Bryant
Publications,LLC v. City of Lake City, Tennessee, the plaintiff was able
to convince the court (at a preliminary injunction stage) that its
trademark ("ROCKY TOP") was valid, as well as strong or famous for
purposes of a likelihood of confusion analysis due to its license
agreement with the University of Tennessee. 14 5 The court accepted the
plaintiffs arguments that the University of Tennessee was a wellknown entity, such that the House of Bryant trademarks would be as
well. 14 6 A second recent case from the Middle District of Florida, Meth
Lab Cleanup, LLC v. Spaulding Decon, utilized a settlement agreement
that had been previously entered into between the parties whereby the
defendant had agreed to acknowledge the validity of the plaintiffs
arguably generic trademark. 147 Although the court did not explicitly
143. Amazon TOS, supra note 2.
144. See supra note 13.
145. House of Bryant Publ'ns, LLC v. Lake City, Tenn., No. 3:14-CV-93-TAV-HBG,. 2014
WL 5449672, at *8 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 22, 2014) ("Plaintiff argues that its 'ROCKY TOP' marks
are famous, as the phrase is 'an immediately recognizable and highly distinctive trademark most
strongly associated with Plaintiffs primary licensee, the University of Tennessee' . . . . The
Court finds these points persuasive at this juncture to suggest that [P]laintiff s marks are strong."
(citation omitted)).
146. Id.
147. Meth Lab Cleanup, LLC v. Spaulding Decon, No. 8:14-cv-3129-T-30TBM, 2015 WL
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state this, implicit in the court's finding that the defendant could not
challenge the validity of the plaintiffs mark was an adoption of the
objective theory of contracting: even if the defendant never read the
agreement, he did manifest an objective intention to enter into it, and
therefore should be bound by it.148
There is some evidence that courts may be delineating between
contracts as evidence (like the House of Bryant and Meth Clean Up
Labs cases were doing) and user numbers. For example, in a recent
case from the Western District of Washington, Treemo, Inc. v.
Flipboard, Inc., the court found probative the evidence submitted by
Flipboard that its marks, "F" and "Flipboard," were strong due in part to
its user numbers and monthly downloads.1 4 9 The court stated that:
"Evidence adduced at trial overwhelmingly establishes that the
FLIPBOARD marks are commercially strong. Over 130 million people
have used the Flipboard app, and 200,000 to 300,000 new users are
added every day."1 5 0 In addition, this case does provide evidence that
courts are more amenable to accepting newer forms of technological
evidence to provide support for strength or fame. This is also mirrored
in decisions from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office and the
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board.]s5
Notwithstanding the Flipboard case, the cases involving offline
agreements and the arguments being made in trademark opposition
proceedings do provide cause for concern. Particularly with respect to
federal district court cases, where judges are fond of using contracts as
evidence, perhaps due in part to their seeming objectivity and the strong
trend toward upholding the freedom to contract in the United States. 152
In addition, courts have very infrequently distinguished between offline
and online agreements. 15 3 In fact, since the earliest cases, courts have
analogized between offline and online agreements and have upheld the
enforceability of online agreements based on the similar requirements of
offline agreements.1 5 4
For example, in the earliest case of
4496193, at *1 (M.D. Fla. July 23, 2015).
148. Id. at *8.
149. Treemo, Inc. v. Flipboard, Inc., 53 F. Supp. 3d 1342, 1355 (W.D. Wash. 2014).
150. Id.
151. See Ouellete, supra note 77, at 399 ("[A]lthough courts have been reluctant to rely on
search results, the TTAB is considering such evidence more frequently, although this acceptance
is not uniform.").
152. Jones v. U-Haul Co. of Mass. & Ohio Inc., 16 F. Supp. 3d 922, 942 (S.D. Ohio 2014)
("Ohio courts hold the 'concept of freedom of contract to be fundamental to our society."'
(quoting Royal Indem. Co. v. Baker Protective Serv., Inc., 515 N.E.2d 5, 7 (Ohio Ct. App.
1986))).
153. Moringiello, supra note 46, at 1320.
154. Id.
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browsewraps, the Second Circuit in Specht v. Netscape found that the
online agreement was invalid due to a lack of notice of the contract
terms. 15 5 However, where all the requirements of offline agreements
are met, courts routinely uphold all types of online agreements.1 5 6 All
of this leads to the very real possibility that when confronted with
online agreements to bolster proof of trademark strength or fame, courts
will be amenable to accepting such evidence. In so doing, courts will be
implicitly importing the objective theory of contracting into trademark
law. As I will argue in the next Section, this would be extremely
problematic for at least two reasons.
B. Normative Arguments Against Importing the Objective Theory of
Contractinginto TrademarkLaw
There are at least two normative arguments to be made against
importing the objective theory of contracting into trademark law. The
first is a theoretical disconnect between the two disciplines, and the
second is that such an adoption would lower the burden of proof for
trademark fame.
Lowering the burden of proof comes with
consequences, such as fostering an anticompetitive business
environment. I will discuss these two arguments in turn.
1. Theoretical Disconnect
Contract law and trademark law are connected areas of the law.
After all, trademarks are vehicles through which products are sold and
contracts are the mode of transportation.
Without contract law,
trademarks would not be as valuable as they are today because many
businesses may not have flourished without the certainty of
contracting. 157 Therefore, it may seem natural that contact theory may
be equally applicable to trademark law. While this may be true with
respect to other contract theories, with respect to the objective theory of
contracting and trademark law's fame doctrine, this is not the case. In
fact, there is a serious theoretical disconnect between the objective
theory and the realist theory that underlies the fame doctrine.
The theoretical premises upon which the objective theory of
contracting is based are efficiency and business efficacy. As I discussed
155. Specht, et al. v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 29-30 (2d Cir. 2002).
156. KIM, supra note 8, at 43.
157. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. An example of this is the Singer sewing
machine, which was one of the success stories of the standard-form contract. The Singer sewing
machine and its trademark became so popular that in 1896, the trademark was declared generic by
the U.S. Supreme Court. See Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 203 (1896)
("[T]he word 'Singer,' as we have seen, had become public property, and the defendant had a
right to use it.").
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in Part L.A above, the objective theory of contracting was adopted to
stabilize the certainty of contract enforcement. Under the objective
theory, outward manifestations of assent to an agreement (a handshake,
signature, etc.) were sufficient to bind the parties to their contract, even
if they subjectively had different meanings or expectations. While
courts developed interpretative doctrines and defenses to resolve
disputes, the objective theory had the desired effect of fostering a stable
contracting environment. Instead of contract dissolution in the event of
two different subjective meanings, courts would look at interpretative
doctrines and maxims such as "contra proferentum" (construing a
written document's ambiguity against the drafter).1 58
Although the objective theory of contracting is good for business, it is
in essence a legal fiction. One of the downsides to a purely objective
approach is that parties may be deemed to be bound to a contract neither
of the parties intended. 159 With the objective theory of contracting,
however, the burden is placed on the parties to ensure that they
understand the terms of the contract (including the other party's
meaning of the terms) before manifesting an outward sign of assent.
Aside from some limited exceptions, this burden is maintained in all
contracting situations, even where assenting parties do not receive
contractual terms until after they have accepted them, or when the terms
are too complicated or long to be understood by an average reader. 16 0
By contrast, I argue that legal realism and subjectivity are the
theoretical premises upon which trademark law's doctrine of fame
(ranging from the spectrum of secondary meaning, strong to famous) is
based. Rather than adopting legal fictions for the sake of efficiency, the
search for a mark's fame is grounded in factual context. As I discussed
in Part II, the analysis of a mark's acquired distinctiveness is one
grounded in the reality of consumer perception. 16 1 The goal of an
acquired distinctiveness analysis is to figure out how consumers really
perceive the mark at issue. This is an inherently subjective inquiry into
the minds of the consumers and is reflected in how judges and courts
approach the analysis. Judges claim to put themselves in the shoes of
the consumer, even where consumers are young children or women and

158. See Miller v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 502 F.3d 1245, 1253 (10th Cir. 2007) ("Contra
proferentem construes all ambiguities against the drafter.").
159. KNAPP, CRYSTAL & PRINCE, supra note 25, at 375 ("This objective approach, however,
led to the striking conclusion that contractual language could be given a meaning that neither of
the parties intended.").
160. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 55, at 1447.
161. See supra note 113.
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the judge is a male. 16 2 Further, judges claim to speak for consumers in
deciding what would be important to them or not. For example, in
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., Justice Scalia
purported to speak for consumers: "The consumer who buys a branded
product does not automatically assume that the brand-name company is
the same entity that came up with the idea for the product, or designed
the product-and typically does not care whether it is."163
Unfortunately, as explained above in Part 11, obtaining direct
evidence of consumers' subjective perceptions of trademarks is
difficult. Due to this, courts have developed proxies for attempting to
pierce the consumer mind-these proxies are all grounded in context,
which is the hallmark of legal realism. 164 Assumptions are made about
these proxies and their impact on consumers; for example, where a
trademark has been in use over a wide geographical territory, along with
a progression in sales and money spent on advertising, the assumption is
that consumers will have come to recognize the trademark (and perhaps
even have a high recognition).1 65 These assumptions, however, are an
attempt to ground the inquiry in reality.
Therefore, courts are conducting an analysis under trademark law that
is completely the opposite of contract law. Yet, if the objective theory
of contracting were imported into trademark law for the purposes of
determining a mark's acquired distinctiveness, we would be replacing
the long-standing goal of legal reality for one steeped in fiction. By
presuming that consumers recognize trademarks that they have never
encountered, but are listed on a click-through webpage from an online
agreement, the resulting effect would be theoretical dissonance. This
would cause an inconsistency between the fame doctrine and other
trademark doctrines, such as functionality or even confusion.
In
addition, flowing from such an importation of the objective theory
would be an undesired consequence of lowering the burden of proof of
fame, which will be discussed next.
2. Lowering the Burden of Proof for Fame
Currently, the burden of proof for fame is set at a high bar. 166 The
rationale behind this is fairly straightforward. At each stage of the
trademark fame spectrum, a trademark increasingly gains a larger scope
162. See Ann Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 41 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 721, 779-88 (2004).
163. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 32 (2003).
164. KNAPP, CRYSTAL & PRINCE, supra note 25, at 12-13.
165. Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124 F.3d 137, 143 n.4 (2d Cir. 1997)
(quoting Centaur Commc'ns v. A/S/N Commc'ns, 830 F.2d 1217, 1222 (2d Cir. 1987)).
166. See supra Part II.B.
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of rights and a greater ability to exclude others from using such mark.
Starting from the birth of a mark, anything under the sun, including
common everyday words, can be considered a trademark if it is
considered distinctive. 167 Being granted a trademark for a common
word or design means that the mark holder has the ability to exclude
others from using such mark, depending on the level of fame. Simply
acquiring distinctiveness limits the scope of exclusivity to the same
category of products as the mark-for example, a trademark used for a
magazine could not enjoin the use of the same trademark for women's
clothing or food. 168 However, the scope expands further in the life of
the trademark. If a mark is considered commercially strong, the
trademark holder will be able to exclude others from using the same or
similar marks on related products. Thus, a trademark used for women's
clothing could enjoin uses in other product categories, such as personal
care. 169 Finally, at the end of the spectrum, a famous mark's scope of
exclusivity is almost limitless. It makes sense, therefore, to set the
burden of proof at a fairly high level, as a holder of a famous trademark
is able to control almost all unauthorized uses of its mark. For example,
Louis Vuitton, with its famous "toile" monogram was able to enjoin
Hyundai from using a one-second clip of a basketball with a similar
design in one of its car commercials. 17 0
If the objective theory of contracting were imported into trademark
law, the current high bar for proof of fame would be lowered for some
large entities. The ability to prove fame through the use of online
agreements would mean that those large entities with popular websites
would easily be able to prove fame for all of their trademarks simply
through the number of users. For instance, Twitter has approximately
304 million monthly active users, while Facebook has approximately
1.49 billion. 17 1 While these large entities' dominant marks are likely
167. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995) ("Since human beings
might use as a 'symbol' or 'device' almost anything at all that is capable of carrying meaning,
this language, read literally, is not restrictive.").
168. See Wish Atlanta, LLC v. Contextlogic, Inc., No. 4:14-CV-51, 2015 WL 7761265, at *8
(M.D. Ga. Dec. 2, 2015) (holding that the plaintiffs "WISH" marks for clothing were weak and
therefore the plaintiff could not enjoin the defendant from using the same mark in the technology
field); see also Family Circle, Inc. v. Family Circle Assocs. Inc., 332 F.2d 534, 540 (3d Cir.
1964).
169. See Wet Seal Inc. v. FD Mgmt. Inc., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1629, 1641-42 (T.T.A.B.
2007).
170. Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Hyundai Motor Am., No. 10 Civ. 161 1(PKC), 2012 WL
1022247, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2012).
171. Facebook: Number of Monthly Active Users Worldwide 2008-2015, STATISTA,
http://www.statista.com/statistics/264810/number-of-monthly-active-facebook-users-worldwide/
(last visited Mar. 29, 2015); Twitter: The Number ofMonthly Active Users 2010-2015, STATISTA,
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strong or famous, their online agreements contain references to
trademarks that are not dominant (or not even used on the main website)
or are portions of the dominant mark. 17 2 The objective theory would
have courts accepting the legal fiction of consumer recognition, thereby
providing these non-dominant or portions of dominant marks the status
of strong or famous, with the resulting high levels of protection as
described above.
There are serious consequences from lowering the burden of proof
for fame and providing such high levels of protection. These include
depletion of the English language, erosion of free speech, and business
competition concerns. With respect to the English language, new
research is shedding light on the long-held assumption that the pool
from which to pick new trademarks is very large. 173 Professors Barton
Beebe and Jeanne Fromer are analyzing the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office's recently released Trademark Case Files Dataset, which consists
of information relating to 7.4 million trademark applications filed with
the Office between the years 1870 and 2014.174 What they are finding
is empirical evidence that the size of the universe from which to pick
trademarks is shrinking. In fact, Professors Beebe and Fromer have
found from this dataset that there is already a high proportion of English
words registered in the United States and a "limited availability of
possible coinages not already identical or similar to registered word
marks."1 75
Based on this, if a greater proportion of registered
trademarks were considered strong or famous, whole swathes of the
English language would be considered proprietary intellectual property
of private entities.
The privatization of the English language leads to the next problem
with lowering the burden of proof for fame, which is a curtailment of
free speech in the United States. The rise of the Internet has not only
seen a rise in the use of online agreements, but also in the ability by
http://www.statista.com/statistics/282087/number-of-monthly-active-twitter-users/
Mar. 29, 2016).
172. See, e.g., Amazon TOS, supra note 2; Facebook 2013 TOS, supra note 10.
173.

WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A.

POSNER,

(last visited

THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 172 (2003) ("[T]he universe from which trademarks are picked
is very large. . . . The number of distinctive yet pronounceable combinations of letters to form
words that will serve as a suitable trademark is very large, implying a high degree of
substitutability and hence only a slight value in exchange." (footnote omitted)).
174. Barton Beebe & Jeanne Fromer, Is the Frontier Closing? Registration Rates of
Frequently Used Words on the PTO's Trademark Register, http://law.depaul.edu/about/centersand-institutes/center-for-intellectual-property-law-and-information-technology/programs/ipscholars-conference/Documents/ipsc_2015/abstracts-papers-presentation/BeebeBabstract.pdf
(last visited Mar. 29, 2016).
175. Id.
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trademark holders to detect any potential infringement of their claimed
trademarks. 1 7 6 For example, consumer reviews that were previously
limited to word of mouth or in print (such as Consumer Reports) are all
available online and now easily discovered by trademark holders. 17 7
Trademark holders are attempting to control all uses of their marks
online, particularly in cases where third-party uses are not positive ones.
This can result in trademark holders bringing infringement allegations
and actions against reviewers, such as in the International Payment
Services, LLC v. Cardpaymentoptions.com, Inc. case. 178 The defendant
in that case had reviewed the plaintiffs credit services and the online
reviews included the plaintiffs trademark and logo. The defendant's
review (as well as forty other reviews of the plaintiffs services) was not
very complimentary.1 7 9 The plaintiff alleged trademark infringement
for the use of its mark on the site. Luckily, the court (as have other
courts) found in the defendant's favor, holding that the defense of
nominative fair use shielded the defendant's use of the plaintiffs
trademark in this manner. 180
As Professor Eric Goldman has
consistently noted, the fact that courts are routinely finding in favor of
defendants in cases like these has not stopped trademark holders from
bringing such lawsuits.18 1
Unfortunately, what these types of trademark holders are attempting
to accomplish is to stifle speech.
As Professor Goldman has
insightfully stated, "it's ludicrous to hold a review website liable for
trademark infringement for reviewing the trademark owner--especially
when it's a critical review, which increases our suspicion that the
trademark owner is really seeking to suppress negative commentary, not
redress a trademark injury." 82 In addition to attempting to stifle
negative commentary, trademark holders may also attempt to stifle
commercial speech by competitors or other businesses. A particular
instance when there may be an unconstitutional restriction of free
176. Leah Chan Grinvald, Policing Cease-and-Desist Letters, 49 U.S.F. L. REv. 411, 418
(2015) ("Potential violations of one's rights are easily discoverable with specialized software or
even by conducting a quick Google search.").
177.

ERIC GOLDMAN, TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY

RESEARCH 411-12 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis eds., 2008).
178. Complaint, Int'l Payment Servs., LLC v. CardPaymentOptions.com, Inc., No. 2:14-cv02604-CBM-JC (C.D. Cal. June 5,2015), 2014 WL 1418671.
179. Id at 2.
180. Id. at 12.
181. Eric Goldman, Competitive Keyword Advertising Permitted as Nominative UseElitePay Global v. CardPaymentOptions, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (June 17, 2015),
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2015/06/competitive-keyword-advertising-permitted-asnominative-use-elitepay-global-v-cardpaymentoptions.htm.
182. Id.
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speech is where the trademark in question is a descriptive mark, 183 as
advocated by Professor Lisa Ramsey. 184
Professor Ramsey has
eloquently argued that,
[c]ommercial expression is suppressed more than necessary when our
trademark laws allow one company to register the descriptive term
"Park 'N Fly" for airport parking lot services, and enjoin competitors,
such as "Dollar Park and Fly," from using "Park and Fly" as part of
their brand name to inform customers that they can park and fly at this
particular airport parking lot.185

As can be seen, free speech concerns occur across the spectrum of
potential speakers. If the burden of proof for fame were lowered, it is
possible speech could further be restricted through the adoption of these
types of arguments by courts, or even through more aggressive policing
in this area by trademark holders.
A final concern I would like to address that stems from lowering the
burden of proof for fame is the harm to business competition. This is
sometimes an overlooked concern when discussing the enlargement of
trademark rights, as more serious concerns to society can take form in
the loss of our rights to freely express ourselves. No less important,
however, is the ability of businesses (of all sizes) to freely compete in
our consumer-oriented marketplace. In fact, ensuring that all businesses
have the ability to compete fairly is a goal of trademark law, which is a
species of unfair competition law. 18 6 A number of scholars, including
myself, have argued that trademark rights can be used to stifle
competition by large entities. 187 Professor Rosemary Coombe has
stated that "[p]rotecting consumers from potential confusion becomes
the ruse by which corporations protect themselves from
competition." 188 In addition, I have argued that small businesses, which
are uniquely susceptible to claims of trademark infringement, are the
entities that often provide competition to large and established
businesses. 189 Lowering the burden of proof for fame would provide
large entities the ability to exclude other businesses, particularly small
183. See Ramsey, supra note 20, at 1097 ("A descriptive mark is a word, name, or symbol
used to indicate a brand of product or service that also describes the qualities or characteristics of
the product or service sold under that mark.").
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1099-100 (footnote omitted).
186. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916).
187. Grinvald, supra note 176, at 436.
188. ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL
AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW 66 (1998).

PROPERTIES:

189. Grinvald, supra note 176, at 436 ("In the marketplace, it is often the small businesses and
individuals who provide competition to the established businesses in any particular industry,
often by offering cheaper or cutting-edge alternatives.").
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ones, from utilizing the same or similar marks to sell products that
compete directly with the large entity. In the end, consumers are the
ones who are harmed, as competition is typically the best way of
lowering high prices and ensuring robust consumer choice. 19 0
In conclusion, the combination of a theoretical disconnect with the
serious consequences that stem from lowering the burden of proof for
trademark fame supports an argument mitigating against the importation
of the objective theory of contracting into trademark law. I readily
acknowledge, however, that there could be some criticisms of my
concerns and I briefly address these potential criticisms in the next
Section.
C. PotentialCriticisms
There are a number of potential criticisms to my concerns over
importing the objective theory of contracting into trademark law. I will
address two of those concerns in this Section: (1) that I might be
worrying over nothing, and (2) that notwithstanding the theoretical
disconnect, importing the objective theory may make trademark
infringement cases more efficient.
1. Worry Over Nothing?
I admit that my worry over importing the objective theory of
contracting into trademark law may be for naught. After all, there are
not that many cases where courts have used offline or online agreements
to prove trademark distinctiveness. It could be that judges are quite
capable of distinguishing between arguments to use online agreements
to prove fame and the use of total website users. As I acknowledged
earlier, in such a situation, it is likely that a judge is not importing the
objective theory of contracting if she is looking at the use of total
website users, particularly for dominant marks that appear on the
website. 19 1 Nonetheless, I believe my concerns are justified for two
reasons: the tendency of trademark holders to attempt to enforce nondominant and portions of their dominant marks, and the alluring nature
of using contracts as evidence.

190. For example, in the market of dog accessories, Haute Diggity Dog was able to produce
chewable dog toys called "Chewy Vuiton" for a price of $10 each, whereas Louis Vuitton sells
dog accessories costing approximately $1,600. Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity
Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 268 (4th Cir. 2007); see Peter Lattman, "Chewy Vuiton " Beats Louis
Vuitton, But Feels a Bite, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Nov. 28, 2006), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/
2006/ll/28/chewy-vuiton-beats-louis-vuitton-but-feels-a-bite/.
191. See supra Part Ill.A (discussing the Flipboard case).
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First, large trademark holders have recently been attempting to
enforce non-dominant marks, as well as portions of their dominant
marks. Two good examples of this are the enforcement strategies of
Facebook and Amazon. 192 I have peppered this Article with references
to Facebook's enforcement of "Book" against all types of online
entities. 19 3 This enforcement occurs informally through cease-anddesist letters, as well as formally through federal litigation and
oppositions brought at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. 19 4 In
addition, this enforcement occurs against all types of uses of the word
"Book," even where the alleged infringer argues that its use is in a
generic or descriptive sense. 1 9 5 A recent example of this is Facebook's
opposition against the term "DesignBook," which was inspired by the
design books that the founders of a startup used in engineering
school. 196 With respect to Amazon, their trademark enforcement
strategy appears largely focused on oppositions at the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office, with their objections to other applicants' marks
based on their non-dominant "Whisper" mark. 19 7
Second, it is likely very enticing to a judge to utilize contracts as
evidence. In the realm of the types of evidence admissible in federal
court, contracts are considered to be admissible documents and not
inadmissible hearsay. 19 8 As the Ninth Circuit has held, "a written
contract . . . memorializes the fact of a legal agreement . . . [and] falls
outside the definition of hearsay." 199 Other appellate courts have held
likewise. In fact, in a copyright infringement lawsuit, the Fifth Circuit

192. Jon Brodkin, Facebook Asserts Trademark on Word "Book" in New User Agreement,
(Mar. 23, 2012 1:20 PM); US PTO, TTABVUE, http://ttabvue.uspto.gov/ttabvue/
(search "Amazon" in "Party" for search results that include oppositions brought against
applications for the mark "Whisper").
193. See, e.g., Facebook 2013 TOS, supranote 10.
194. See, e.g., Facebook, Inc. v. Teachbook.com, LLC, 819 F. Supp. 2d 764 (N.D. 111. Sept.
26, 2011); see also Robin Wauters, Hey Facebook, Here are Some Other Companies you can
Bully or Sue, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 26, 2010), http://techcrunch.com/2010/08/26/facebookplacebook-teachbook/.
195. See AJ Dellinger, FacebookBullies Startup Over Name Trademark, DAILY DOT (June 4,
AM), http://www.dailydot.com/technology/facebook-designbook-trademark/;
2015,
11:16
Tiffany R. Johnson, Facebook Is Accepting No Friend Requests: Trademark of "Generic Plus"
Words Makes Fast Adversaries, J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. (Oct. 30, 2010). http://ipjournal.
law.wfu.edu/2010/10/facebook-is-accepting-no-friend-requests-trademark-of-generic-plus-wordsmakes-fast-adversaries/.
196. Joe Mullin, Facebook Sics Trademark Lawyers on "Designbook" Startup, ARS
TECHNICA (June 2, 2015, 12:24 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/06/facebook-sicstrademark-lawyers-on-designbook-startup/.
197. See Brodkin, supra note 192.
198. FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
199. United States v. Bellucci, 995 F.2d 157, 161 (9th Cir. 1993).
ARS TECHNICA
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held that the defendant's objection to the admission of a licensing
agreement based on hearsay grounds was unfounded. The court stated:
The objection was-in fact-inapposite. . . . Under the objective
theory of contracts, the fact that two parties signed a contract is
enough to create legal rights, whatever the signatories might have
been thinking when they signed it. The admission of a contract to
prove the operative fact of that contract's existence thus cannot be the
subject of a valid hearsay objection. 200
2. More Efficient Resolution of Trademark Litigation Suits?
A second criticism or argument against my thesis that the objective
theory of contracting should not be imported into trademark law is that
such importation could actually lead to more efficient resolutions of
infringement lawsuits. Online agreements could serve as probative
evidence to shortcut the fact-heavy analysis that courts are currently
required to undertake in trademark infringement litigation. This could
make trademark litigation more efficient because currently parties to the
suit need to submit high volumes of evidence to prove fame.
Correspondingly, courts need to sift through and analyze such evidence,
which makes trademark litigation fairly inefficient.
The use of online agreements as evidence of fame could be akin to a
bright-line rule because under the objective theory the court would not
have to question the validity of the trademark acknowledgement. The
problem with this argument is that courts have routinely rejected brightline rules in trademark litigation, unless they are provided for in the
federal trademark statute. 20 1 For example, the Supreme Court in
Qualitex overturned a lower court's ruling that colors could never be
considered distinctive. 20 2 Instead, the Court held that "no special legal
rule prevents color alone from serving as a trademark." 20 3 In addition,
the gains in efficiency that could be achieved from using contracts as
stand-alone evidence of fame would be small, compared to the likely
high levels of inaccuracies that would occur. These inaccuracies would
be where courts find fame for generic or merely descriptive terms based
on this evidence. Therefore, it is unlikely that an efficiency argument
could serve as a stand-alone reason to import the objective theory of
contracting into trademark law.

200. Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v. Leadership Software, 12 F.3d 527, 540 (5th Cir. 1994).
201. See, e.g., Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 196 (1985) (holding
that the Lanham Act's incontestability provision meant that an incontestable mark could not be
challenged based on being merely descriptive because of the text of the federal trademark law).
202. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 160 (1995).
203. Id. at 161.
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IV. SOME SOLUTIONS

Although I have argued against the importation of the objective
theory of contracting into trademark law, I do recognize that courts may
be tempted to utilize online agreements as evidence of fame. Based on
this, I advance two proposals that could assist in overcoming the
importation of the objective theory while utilizing online agreements as
evidence of fame. The first is to scrutinize the online agreements
carefully and the second is to adopt an "interactive theory" of
distinctiveness. I will discuss each in turn.
A. Scrutinize Agreements Carefully
My first proposal is not ground breaking, but builds upon what judges
already do in contract dispute cases, namely, scrutinize the online
agreements entered into evidence very carefully. Typically, parties to a
contract dispute will first argue over formation of the contract. 204
Based on the objective theory of contracting, it is highly unlikely that a
court would find a lack of contract formation. 20 5 The next step after
finding that the parties entered into a binding contract is to interpret the
terms in dispute. 2 06
As such, I encourage courts that will be faced with such evidence to
look at the terms of the online agreement and understand what the terms
are attempting to do. For example, based on my categorization of these
terms in Part III, I would encourage courts to scrutinize very carefully
contracts that fall into category one, contracts where the trademark
provision has a list of specific marks. If faced with this type of
provision, I would encourage the court to question which trademarks are
being asserted in the litigation and whether website users encounter
such marks in any place on the website other than in the online
agreement. If the answer is in the negative, or the marks are very rarely
encountered, then I would encourage the court to not provide any
probative weight to such an agreement. An example of this is
Amazon's "Whisper" mark, which is listed on Amazon's "nonexhaustive" list of 462 trademarks, but does not appear on any of the
main pages of its website. 207 In fact, one has to search for the very
specific "WhisperSync" mark in order to obtain any results. 2 08
204. See, e.g., Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 229, 235 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (addressing
arguments of contract formation before interpretation).
205. Moringiello, supra note 46, at 1320.
206. See, e.g., Feldman, 513 F. Supp. 2d, at 239-44 (analyzing the contract's terms for
unconscionability after deciding the formation question).
207. Amazon TOS, supra note 2.
208. See AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com (last visited Mar. 29, 2016).
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B. Adopt an "Interactive" Theory ofFame
My second proposal is more wide ranging, and is also intended to
assist in the use by courts of website user numbers (even if divorced
from the online agreements, as seen in the Flipboardcase). I propose
that courts adopt an "interactive" theory of trademark distinctiveness.
This theory is intended to capture the analysis that courts are already
undertaking in distinctiveness, which is the connection between the
mark and consumers. 20 9 However, this theory provides more concrete
guidance to courts when undertaking this analysis. Although I have
previously argued that this theory could assist in determining when a
trademark has reached "well-known" mark status, I believe that it is
equally applicable to the broader question of distinctiveness. 2 10
The main thrust of the interactive theory of distinctiveness is that
consumers learn to recognize trademarks as source identifiers, and then
as famous marks, through direct experiences with the mark. 2 1 1 As I
have noted elsewhere, manufacturers already recognize this method of
cognitive learning of trademarks and have adjusted their marketing
campaigns accordingly. 2 12 For example, one of the touted methods of
promoting a new product (and hence its trademark) is to provide
product giveaways. 2 13 By providing the actual product to consumers to
experience, manufacturers are initiating a direct experience between the
consumer and the product, which raises the possibility of trademark
recognition. 2 14
The interactive theory is equally applicable to the online context,
where users are initiating direct experiences with websites they visit or
applications they use on their smartphones or tablets. The more users
are forced to interact with a particular trademark through clicking, the
more likely it is that they will recognize the trademarks that they
209.
210.
211.
212.

Greene & Wilkerson, supranote 11, at 555.
See generally Grinvald, supra note 11.
Id. at 45.
See Leah Chan Grinvald, Interactivity, Territoriality, and Well-Known Marks, in

TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND TERRITORIALITY CHALLENGES IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 45-46

(Irene Calboli & Edward Lee eds., 2014) ("[Tlrademark holders are already cognizant of this
evolution in the manner of gaining consumer recognition: think of all of the 'sampling' that is
done at grocery stores, or 'free samples' of products that are given away at fairs or festivals.").
213. See, e.g., Steve Olenski, 5 Inexpensive Ways to Promote a Product Launch, FORBES
(Oct. 14, 2014, 9:38 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/steveolenski/2014/10/14/5-inexpensiveways-to-promote-a-product-launch/.
214. See Frank R. Kardes et al., Construal-Level Effects on Preference Stability, PreferenceBehavior Correspondence, and the Suppression of Competing Brands, 16 J. CONSUMER
PSYCHOL. 135, 137 (2006) (citing three previous studies, and finding: "[p]rior research has shown
that direct (vs. indirect) experiences with an object are likely to lead to the spontaneous formation
of strong attitudes that are highly accessible in memory.").
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encounter on the sites or applications. Courts should adopt this theory
when analyzing the evidence presented to prove any level of
distinctiveness on the spectrum, whether it is secondary meaning,
strength, or fame. In particular, courts could require that plaintiffs
provide web analytic-type evidence to prove the amount of time users
are spending with particular parts of the website, how often they are
clicking on links that include the site's claimed trademarks, and so
forth.2 15 This type of evidence does not need to be to the exclusion of
other relevant evidence, such as progression of sales over the time
period of the mark's use, but could help shed more insight into how
consumers really perceive the trademark at issue. Adoption of this
theory would provide guidance to courts in an area that is extremely
difficult to navigate.
CONCLUSION

The fields of contract law and trademark law overlap in significant
ways: without the certainty of contracting, it is likely that trademarked
goods and services would not be freely traded. Therefore, it may be
tempting to blindly accept at face value that a theory that appears to
work well in contract law could work equally as well in trademark law.
My goal of this Article has been to show that before we import a theory
from one area of the law into another, we should more consciously
question such importation. In this Article, I focused on the question of
importing one specific theory of contract law into trademark law, but
the questioning should be applied to other fields of law and other
theories. In particular, the questioning should focus on the "fit" of the
imported theory with existing theories, as well as the consequences that
could flow from such importation.
With respect to the importation of the objective theory of contracting
into trademark law, I have argued against such importation. My main
two arguments are based on the theoretical disconnect, in addition to
serious real-life consequences, that would flow from such importation.
Given that the utilization of user and download numbers are a tempting
shortcut for difficult decisions regarding trademark fame, I have offered
two proposals to assist decision makers, including the adoption of an
interactive theory of trademark fame. My proposals are non-exhaustive
and it is my hope that this Article will simply highlight this as a
problem to take seriously and start a discussion of how to resolve it.

215. See generally AVINASH KAUSHIK, WEB ANALYTICS 2.0: THE ART OF ONLINE
ACCOUNTABIITY & SCIENCE OF CUSTOMER CENTRICITY (2010) (defining web analytics and
arguing for better use of such data).
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